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I. Introduction

T

HE LAW OF WEAPONRY, which seeks to regulate both the means and
the methods of warfare, is one of the oldest and best established areas of
the laws of war.! It is also widely regarded as one of the least effective. The
remarkable progress which has been made in the development of weaponry and
methods of warfare during the twentieth century has been unmatched by
development in the law. The result is that much of the law and the legal
literature in this field has a distinctly anachronistic feel. For example, the
prohibition of weapons causing unnecessary suffering2 was first established over
a century ago but remains part of the law and was recently applied by the
International Court of Justice in considering the legality of nuclear weapons.3
Yet a 1973 survey of the law on weaponry by the United Nations Secretariat
cited bayonets or lances with barbs, irregular shaped bullets, and projectiles
filled with glass as examples of weapons considered to be outlawed by the
unnecessary suffering principle.4 Scarcely standard weapons at the beginning of
the twentieth century, these were museum pieces by its end. Similarly, leading
text books refer to the unnecessary suffering principle meaning that "cannons
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The Law of Weaponry
must not be loaded with chain shot, crossbar shot, red,hot balls', and the like."s
Such examples suggest that the law is firmly rooted in the nineteenth century.
Yet it would be wrong to write off the law on weaponry as unimportant in
modem warfare. The twentieth century has seen the adoption of prohibitions on
, two of the century's most destructive innovations in weaponry-chemical and
"bacteriological weapons.6 In the closing years of the century, there has been a
burst of activity, unprecedented in this area since the Hague Peace Conferences
of 1899 and 1907, which has produced treaties on blinding laser weapons7 and
anti,personnelland mines,s as well as a treaty which greatly strengthens the ban
on chemical weapons. In addition, the evolution of customary international law
regarding the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict has had
effects on the law of weaponry, while the discussion of the legality of nuclear
weapons by the International Court of Justice, though inconclusive and
unsatisfactory in a number of respects, demonstrated that principles established
in the last century are capable of being applied well into the next.9 Finally, wider
developments in the laws of armed conflict, in particular the development of the
law by the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the
negotiations for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court,
have had repercussions for the law on weaponry.tO
It is therefore a good time at which to take stock of the law relating to
weaponry and to consider how that law might develop in the early years of the
new millennium. If that is to be done, however, it is important to have a clear
understanding of the objectives which the law seeks to achieve in this area and
the means by which it has sought, so far, to secure them. Among the reasons why
the law on weaponry is so often seen as ineffective are that its objectives are
misunderstood and unrealistic expectations are entertained as to what can be
achieved. The present paper will accordingly begin ,vith a brief account of the
development of the law (part II) and an analysis of its objectives (Part III). Part
N will then assess the law of weaponry as it stands at the end of the twentieth
century. That law does not, however, operate in isolation, and Part V will
therefore consider the influence of other parts of international law, in particular
those concerned with the restriction of the resort to force, the protection of
human rights, and the environment, which may have an impact upon the use of
weapons in conflicts. Finally, Part VI \vill consider how the law is likely to
develop in the foreseeable future-and how it might be strengthened.

II. The Development of the Law Relating to Weaponry
The prohibition of certain weapons, particularly poisonous weapons, can be
traced back many centuries. The contemporary law on weapons and the
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methods of warfare, however, began to develop only in the mid,nineteenth
century. The Lieber Code ll mentioned the prohibition on the use of poison
and, in its emphasis on the principle of necessity, contained an early, albeit
implicit, statement of the prohibition of weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering. 12 The draft declaration drawn up by the Brussels
Conference in 187413 and the Oxford Manual prepared by the Institute of
International Law in 1880 both contained provisions to the effect that a
belligerent State did not possess an unlimited choice of the methods and means
of war and prohibited the use of poison, treachery, and weapons causing
needless suffering. 14 It is clear, therefore, that by the late nineteenth century
there was considerable support for the proposition that international law
imposed some constraints upon the weaponry which a belligerent might
employ. .
The first treaty to that effect was the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868,
which outlawed the employment in hostilities between parties to the
Declaration of any "projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either
explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances."ls While the
specific prohibition introduced by the Declaration is still in force, a more
important feature of the Declaration is the statement in the Preamble of the
reasoning behind the specific prohibition, namely:
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of
men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable; [and)
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity.

It is this statement which provided the first recognition in treaty form of the
prohibition of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 built upon these
foundations in a number of agreements. Thus, the Regulations on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, adopted at the 1907 Conference, 16 provide that "the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited"
(Article 22) and go on to declare that it is "especially forbidden" "to employ
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arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering"
(Article 23(e». The Peace Conferences also adopted a number of other treaty
provisions relating to weaponry and methods of warfare:
• Hague Declaration No.2, 1899, banning the use of projectiles the sole
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gasesj17
• Hague Declaration No.3, 1899, prohibiting the use of bullets which
expand or flatten easily in the body (especially the so-called soft-headed or
"dum-dum" bullets)jl8
• Hague Declaration No.4, 1899, prohibiting for a period of five years the
launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons and other methods of a
similar naturej19
• Hague Regulations, 1907, Article 23 (a), prohibiting the use of poison or
poisoned weaponsj20
• Hague Convention No. VIII, 1907, restricting the use of automatic
submarine contact mines. 21
Subsequent years saw the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Chemical and
Bacteriological Weapons Protocol, prohibiting the use of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and
bacteriological methods of warfare. 22 This prohibition on the use of chemical
and biological weapons was reinforced many years later by the 1972
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, which prohibited the possession of
bacteriological and toxin weapons,23 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention, which prohibited the possession and use as a means of warfare of
chemical weapons. 24 Neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions,25 nor the two
Additional Protocols to those Conventions, adopted in 1977,26 deal with
specific weapons. Additional Protocol I does, however, contain a restatement
of the principles that belligerents do not have an unlimited right to choose the
methods and means of warfare and may not employ methods or means of
warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering,27 and also codifies important
principles of customary international law regarding the protection of civilian
life and property which have significant consequences for the freedom of States
to select the methods and means of warfare. 28 In addition, the Protocol
contains some innovative provisions on the protection of the environment in
time of armed conflict.29 The protection of the environment was also addressed
in the 1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, which
prohibited the use of weapons intended to change the environment through
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes.30
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Finally, a United Nations conference held in 1980 adopted the 1981 United
Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, the three original Protocols to which prohibited the
use of weapons which injured with fragments which cannot be detected by
(Protocol I) and imposed certain restrictions on the use of mines and
booby traps (protocol II) and incendiary weapons (Protocol III).31 A
subsequent review conference in
adopted an amended Protocol II on
mines (which will be superseded for some States by the 1997 Land Mines
Convention) and a new Protocol IV on laser weapons.32

III. The Objectives of the Law Relating to Weaponry
As the law relating to weaponry is a part of the law of armed conflict, it is
therefore to be expected that its objectives reflect those of the law of armed
conflict as a whole. The law of armed conflict (or international humanitarian
law) is primarily concerned with preserving, as far as possible, certain core
humanitarian values during hostilities. It is not designed to prevent or deter
States from resorting to force, and the constraints which it imposes must not,
therefore, be incompatible with the effective conduct of hostilities. Every State
has an undoubted right of
under international law and is entitled
to use force in order to vindicate that right.33 While the law of armed conflict
imposes limitations upon what a State may do in the exercise of that right, it is
not intended to prevent the effective exercise of the right.34 The law of armed
conflict is thus based upon the assumption that States engaged in an armed
conflict will necessarily inflict death and injury upon persons and damage to
property, and seeks to limit these effects by preventing the infliction of
suffering and damage which is unnecessary because it serves no useful military
purpose. The law goes beyond that, however, for it requires that, even where
destruction does have a military purpose, a balance be struck between the
attainment of that purpose and other values, such as the preservation of
civilian life; it prohibits the carrying out of an attack when the military benefit
which may be expected to ensue is outweighed by the damage to those values.
The principal objective of the law of weaponry is the protection of these
values. Thus, the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons and methods of
warfare is designed to serve the objective of distinguishing between civilians
and civilian objects, on the one hand, and combatants and military objectives,
on the other, and protecting the former. Similarly, the principle that
belligerents may not employ weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to
cause unnecessary suffering serves the objective of pr?tecting even combatants
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from suffering and death which is not necessary for the achievement of
legitimate military goals. The principle, which has only recently become a part
of the law of weaponry, that limits the use of weapons and methods of warfare
which have a substantial adverse effect upon the natural environmenfs also
has as its objective the prevention of wanton, unnecessary destruction and the
balancing of military needs against the value of environmental preservation.
To that extent, the law of weaponry forms part of an intellectually coherent
system. The law has, however, also been used to achieve other objectives which
do not so obviously form part of that system. For example, the prohibition of
perfidy, which has implications for the choice of methods of warfare (if not the
weapons themselves), is designed to serve two very different objectives. In part,
it seeks to preserve core humanitarian values by prohibiting the feigning of
surrender, protected status, or wounds, because such feints endanger those
who genuinely seek to surrender, possess protected status, or are wounded, and
whom the law seeks to protect. The prohibition of perfidy has also, however,
been used to protect able,bodied combatants from attacks which endanger no
one else but which are seen as somehow "unfair." The objective there is the
quite distinct one of preserving certain military or chivalric values. Thus, it is
easy to see that the prohibition on using the Red Cross and Red Crescent
emblems as a shield for military operations36 serves a humanitarian objective,
since abuse of the emblem will endanger genuine medical facilities and
personnel. On the other hand, the prohibition on making use of the emblems
or uniforms of an adversary while engaging in attacks or in order to assist
military operations serves no humanitarian purpose whatsoever; rather, it
seeks to ensure that one party to a conflict does not treat the other in a way
which is perceived to be contrary to concepts offair dealing.37
In addition, the humanitarian objectives of the law of weaponry have
frequently been intertwined with broader concerns about armaments. Thus,
the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 was convened in order to discuss
questions of peaceful settlement of disputes, disarmament, and the laws of war,
the Russian Government whose initiative had led to the convening of the
Conference being particularly concerned to ensure that limits were placed on
the introduction of new weapons and the consequent increases in military
expenditure which these would entail. In adopting the three declarations
banning the use of specific weapons,38 the Conference clearly had that
consideration in mind,39 but was also influenced by humanitarian
considerations. Each of the three Declarations contained a statement to the
effect that the Conference had been "inspired by the sentiments" of the 1868
St. Petersburg Declaration, while the debates reveal that humanitarian
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considerations were to the fore in the discussions.40 Similarly, the attempts to rid
the world of chemical and biological weapons which have lasted throughout the
twentieth century have involved a mixture of humanitarian and disarmament
considerations, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention being couched very
much in the form of a disarmament agreement with its ban on possession as well
as use of chemical weapons and its complex verification system.41
There is, of course, no reason why humanitarian and disarmament
considerations should not be combined. The outlawing of a weapon as cruel
and often indiscriminate as poisonous gas serves the values of disarmament and
humanity and the employment of disarmament mechanisms for verification
makes a ban far more effective than a simple prohibition on use. It should,
however, be borne in mind that the objectives are different. Unlike the law of
armed conflict, the disarmament process is intended to make war less likely by
achieving a reduction in armaments, irrespective of whether the particular
weapons involved are more or less cruel or indiscriminate than others which
may not be the subject of disarmament negotiations.
Finally, in considering the objectives which the law of weaponry is designed to
serve, it is worth remembering that the process by which those objectives have
been applied has not always been one of strict rationality. Consideration of
whether a particular weapon or method of warfare causes unnecessary suffering or
excessive harm to civilians requires a comparison between different weapons and
methods of warfare. Yet the process of comparison has seldom been a scientificor even a particularly informed-one. Deep-seated taboos found in many
societies regarding certain types of injury or means of inflicting harm have meant
that certain types of weapon (those employing or causing fire, for example) have
been treated as particularly horrific, without any serious attempt being made to
compare their effects with those produced by other weapons.
Moreover, a mixture of humanitarian and disarmament considerations has
all too often been used to disguise the pursuit of more self-interested objectives.
The attempts to ban the crossbow in the twelfth century were the product of
concern not only with the injuries which a crossbow could inflict but also with
the way in which this infantry weapon changed the balance of power between
mounted knights and infantrymen of a far lower social standing. 42 Likewise, the
British proposals eight hundred years later to ban the submarine and the naval
mine owed more to the threat which those weapons posed to the supremacy of
the Royal Navy's surface fleet than their challenge to the humanitarian values
underlying the laws of armed conflict. As Captain (later Admiral) Mahan, one
of the United States delegates to the 1899 Peace Conference, explained, new
weapons have always been denounced as barbaricY
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IV. The Law of Weaponry at the End of the Twentieth Century

It has already been seen that the law of weaponry consists of general
principles, such as that prohibiting weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary
suffering, and a number of rules prohibiting, or limiting the use of, specific
weapons or methods of warfare. While the relationship between the two is a
close one, the specific provisions frequently being an extension of one or other
of the general principles, the differences between them are sufficient to justify
separate examination here. In particular, the general principles tend to refer to
the effects produced by the use of weapons or methods of warfare, whereas the
specific provisions usually concentrate upon the means employed. Section 1 of
this Part will therefore consider the general principles, while Section 2 will
examine some of the rules pertaining to specific weapons. Finally, Section 3 will
consider the case of nuclear weapons.
Before turning to the general principles, two preliminary matters call for
comment. First, the law of weaponry-both general and specific-has been
developed in the context of armed conflicts between States. The treaty
provisions have usually been applicable only in conflicts between the parties to
the treaty concerned and even the general principles, which apply as part of
customary law, have usually been seen as applicable only in international
armed conflicts. That assumption is now being challenged. As will be seen,
some of the most recent treaties on specific weapons, noticeably the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention and the two new agreements on land mines
(the 1996 Amended Mines Protocol to the Conventional Weapons
Convention and the 1997 Land Mines Convention) expressly apply to internal
as well as international armed conflicts.44 In addition, the Appeals Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held, in its
decision in Prosecutor v. Taclic Uurisdiction), that the customary international
law applicable to internal armed conflicts is more extensive than had
previously been supposed and, in particular, includes the customary rules
regarding methods and means of warfare which apply in international armed
conflicts.45 As the Appeals Chamber put it:
[E]lementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it
preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts
between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their
own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in
civil strife.46
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This aspect of the decision is controversial, not least because the issue of
methods and means of warfare did not, in fact, arise on the facts of the T adic
case and there is little evidence of State practice to support the conclusion that
the rules of customary international law in internal conflicts are as extensive as
the Appeals Chamber found. The argument of logic is, however, compelling,
and it is likely that the Tadic precedent will be followed on this point,
particularly if the International Criminal Court is established and given
jurisdiction over war crimes committed in internal conflicts. Nevertheless,
some differences remain between the law of weaponry in international conflicts
and that applicable in internal conflicts because some of the specific provisions
on weaponry have not become customary law and, therefore, depend entirely
upon treaties as the basis for their applicability.
Secondly, there have sometimes been differences of opinion over whether
weapons and methods of warfare are lawful unless prohibited (either expressly
or by necessary implication) or whether one should proceed on the basis that
the use of at least certain types of weapon is illegal in the absence of a
permissive rule to the contrary. An element of uncertainty on this question can
be seen in the Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
Weapons case. The Court stated both that international law contained no
"specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons"47 and that it
contained no "comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons as such."48 Nevertheless, an examination of the whole
Opinion demonstrates that the Court did not endorse the argument that
nuclear weapons carried a general stigma of illegality which rendered their use
unlawful in the absence of a permissive exception to the general rule. Had the
Court adopted such an attitude, its finding that there was no rule authorizing
the use of nuclear weapons would have disposed of the case. By holding that
international law contained neither a comprehensive prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons, nor a specific authorization of their use, all the Court did was
to hold that the answer to the General Assembly's question had to be sought in
the application of principles of international law which were not specific to
nuclear weapons. When the Court came to consider those principles, it looked
to see whether they prohibited the use of nuclear weapons, not whether they
authorized such use. In commencing its examination of the law of armed
conflict, the Court stated that:
State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does
not result from an absence of authorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in
terms of prohibition.
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The Court must therefore now examine whether there is any prohibition of
recourse to nuclear weapons as such ....49

This approach, rather than that of seeking a permissive rule, certainly accords
better with State practice in relation to all types of weaponry over an extended
period.
(1) The General Principles of the Law of Weaponry

(a) The Unnecessary Suffering Principle. The most recent statement of this
principle can be found in Article 35 (2) of Additional Protocol I, which
provides that:
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

The principle is a long established part of customary international law which
can be traced back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration and to the Hague
Regulations of 1899 and 1907. As was seen in Part III, the rationale for this
principle is to be found in the broader principle of necessity in armed conflict,
which prohibits wanton violence that serves no legitimate military purpose.50
As well as providing a general yardstick against which all weapons and methods
of warfare must be judged, the unnecessary suffering principle has provided
much of the inspiration for agreements on specific weapons, such as those on
explosive, inflammable and
or expanding bullets,51 chemical and
biological weapons,s2 poison,s3 and weapons which injure with fragments
Some of these agreements go beyond the
which cannot be detected by
general principle in that they prohibit the use of such weapons even in
circumstances where their use might not have been a violation of the general
principle.5s
The unnecessary suffering principle applies to both the methods and means
of warfare. It prohibits outright any weapon (or means of warfare) which is of a
nature to cause unnecessary suffering. In addition, where a particular weapon
has a legitimate use but is also capable of being used in a way which will, in the
circumstances, cause unnecessary suffering (and all weapons can be so used),
the principle prohibits the latter use (or method of warfare) even though it does
not give rise to an outright ban on the weapon itself.
The fact that a particular weapon or method of warfare causes severe or
widespread injuries or death, or inflicts great pain, is not, in itself, sufficient to
render its use incompatible with the unnecessary suffering principle. That
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principle does not possess an absolute character; it does not prohibit the use of
any weapon or method of warfare which causes extreme suffering or extensive
but only those which cause injuries or suffering that are unnecessary.
The application of the unnecessary suffering principle thus requires a balancing
of the military advantage which may result from the use of a weapon with the
degree of injury and suffering which it is likely to cause. As the Japanese court
in the case of Shimada v. The State put it, "the use of a certain weapon, great as
its inhuman result may be, need not be prohibited by international law if it has a
great military effect."s6
This balancing act is, however, easier to state in the abstract than it is to
apply, since one is not comparing like with like and there is considerable
uncertainty regarding the factors to be placed on each side of the scales. A 1975
Conference of Experts held at Lucerne which considered this question agreed
that the principle "involved some sort of equation between, on the one hand,
the degree ofinjury or suffering inflicted (the humanitarian aspect) and, on the
other, the degree of necessity underlying the choice of a particular weapon (the
military aspect),,,S7 but had more difficulty in agreeing on how this should best
be applied. It is important, therefore, to examine the factors which should be
taken into account on each side of the equation.
The Military Aspect. In determining what factors may be taken into account on
the military side of the equation, the Preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration
provides a useful starting point.s8 The Declaration is based upon the premise
that, since the legitimate objective of disabling an enemy combatant could be
achieved with ordinary rifle ammunition, the "rifle shell" or exploding bullet
merely exacerbated injury or rendered death inevitable and should therefore be
prohibited. On the other hand, the high explosive shell, which was far more
destructive and just as deadly, was excluded from this prohibition because it
offered a distinct military advantage in that it could disable several combatants
with one shot or destroy large quantities of property, and thus achieve military
goals which ordinary rifle ammunition could not. In taking the decision which
they did, the States represented at the 1868 Conference rejected two factors
which might have been taken into account on the military side of the equation.
First, they expressly rejected the argument that since a disabled enemy might
recover and be able to fight again, the fact that a weapon made death inevitable
was a legitimate military reason for employing that weapon in preference to
others. The same reasoning is reflected more than a century later in the ban on
weapons which injure with fragments that cannot be detected with x,rays.
Secondly, there was an implicit rejection of the argument that the very savagery
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of a weapon might be a legitimate military advantage because of the effect
which it produced upon the morale of enemy combatants.59
As the first modem attempt to apply the unnecessary suffering principle in a
specific case, the Declaration remains important. Nevertheless, in at least one
picture. The suggestion that the legitimate
respect it presents an
objectives of a belligerent can be achieved by disabling the greatest number of
men overlooks the fact that there are other equally legitimate objectives, such as:
[T]he destruction or neutralisation of enemy materiel, restriction of movement,
interdiction oflines of communication, weakening of resources and, last but not
least, enhancement of the security of friendly forces. 60

It is generally accepted that the weapons needed to achieve such aims differ,
both in character and effect, from those commonly used against personnel and
may cause more serious injuries or make death more likely than would typical
weapons. Nevertheless, their use does not violate the
unnecessary suffering principle, because the advantages which they offer, in
terms, for example, of their capacity to destroy materiel, means that this
additional suffering cannot be characterized as unnecessary.61
The Humanitarian Aspect. Disagreement also exists about what factors
should be taken into account on the "suffering" side of the equation. The
Lucerne Conference considered that
[T]his comprised such factors as mortality rates, the painfulness or severeness of
wounds, or the incidence of permanent damage or disfigurement. Some experts
considered that not only bodily harm but also psychological damage should be
taken into account. Another expert could not accept such a wide interpretation
of the concept at issue, as all wartime wounds, no matter how slight, could entail
severe psychological harm. 62

The present writer considers that the concept of "injury" or "suffering" includes
the totality of a victim's injury, and that a distinction between physical and
psychological injuries would be artificial, as well as having no basis in past
practice concerning weaponry. A more difficult question is whether the effects
of the victim's injuries upon the society from which he or she comes should be
taken into account on this side of the equation- for example, the effect upon a
society of having to cope with large numbers of limbless or blinded former
combatants would invariably be serious and might well be disastrous. Such
effects are, however, difficult to quantify and del2end more upon the numbers
injured than the nature of the injuries in any particular case.
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A report published in 1997 by the International Committee of the Red Cross
attempts to specify more precise criteria for determining whether a particular
weapon causes unnecessary suffering.63 The approach taken in this Report is to
study the medical effects of existing weapons, i.e., the degree to which they
cause death or particular types of injury, and suggest four sets of criteria to be
used in determining whether a new weapon is one which violates the
unnecessary suffering principle.
• Does the weapon foreseeably cause specific disease, specific abnormal
physiological state, specific abnormal psychological state, specific and
permanent disability, or specific disfigurement?
• Does the weapon foreseeably cause a field mortality of more than 25% or
a hospital mortality of more than 5% (figures substantially in excess of those
caused by weapons in use at present)?
• Are the weapons designed to cause particularly large wounds?
• Does the weapon foreseeably exert effects for which there is no well
recognized and proven treatment?
The identification of these criteria and the medical study on which they are
based is of considerable value in helping to show how the balancing act
required by the unnecessary suffering principle can be made more precise and
less anecdotal than at present. It is, however, important to realize that the fact
that a particular weapon meets one of these criteria is not, in itself, sufficient to
brand it as unlawful without consideration of the military advantages which
that weapon may offer. For example, the fact that soldiers cannot take cover
from a particular type of weapon will, as the report points out, heighten the
reaction of abhorrence produced by such a weapon. 64 But it is also the very
inability of soldiers to take cover that means that the weapon will, in the
language of the 1868 Declaration, disable the greatest possible number of
enemy combatants, and which thus gives it its military effectiveness when
compared with other weapons.
Comparison Between Weapons. The essence of the unnecessary suffering
principle is that it involves a comparison between different weapons in
determining whether the injuries and suffering caused by a particular weapon
are necessary. As Dr. Hans Blix has noted, "it is unlawful to use a weapon
which causes more suffering or injury than another which offers the same or
similar military advantages."6S The 1868 Declaration was based, as has been
seen, on precisely such a comparison. In many cases, however, making that
comparison will be more difficult than might appear from a glance at the
approach taken in 1868.
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It is not enough simply to consider the immediate effects of the two weapons
(or methods of warfare) which are being compared. It may well be the case that
the one weapon offers the same or similar destructive capability and accuracy
as another while causing less horrific injuries or a lower level of fatalities. Before
it is concluded, however, that the use of the latter weapon would therefore
cause unnecessary suffering, it is necessary to consider a number of other
factors, in particular the availability (including the expense) of both types of
weapon and the'logistics of supplying the weapon and its ammunition at the
place where it is to be used. A particularly important consideration will be the
extent to which each type of weapon protects the security of the troops which
employ it, for if the use of the first, more "humane," weapon will lead to
Significantly higher casualties amongst the force using it, then there is a valid
military reason for using the second. A belligerent is not obliged to sacrifice
members of its own armed forces in order to spare the enemy's combatants (as
opposed to the enemy's civilian population) the effects of the fighting.66 These
considerations are as much part of the military advantages which the weapon
offers as the effects which its use produces on the enemy.
Moreover, it has to be remembered that the degree of choice of weapons
decreases as one goes down the chain of command. While those who plan or
decide upon operations at the highest levels of command are likely to have a
large range of weapons at their disposal and the battle group or task force
commander retains a significant element of choice, the individual soldier does
not, as Professor Kalshoven puts it, carry the military equivalent of a bag of golf
clubs from which he can select the weapon appropriate to each task; usually
that soldier has no element of choice of weapon at all. 67 This consideration is
likely to be of considerable importance if, which has not hitherto been the case,
individual servicemen face trial on charges of using illegal weapons.
The Effect of the Unnecessary Suffering Principle. Although it is the oldest
principle of the law of weaponry and its continued significance has recently
been reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice, in practice the
unnecessary suffering principle has only very limited effects. In particular, it is
difficult to find a single example of a weapon which has entered into service
during the twentieth century and which is generally agreed to fall foul of this
principle. There are several reasons why that is the case. First, if the question is
whether the weapon itself, as opposed to its use in specific circumstances,
contravenes the principle, there is disagreement about the test to be applied.
At the Lucerne Conference, a paper submitted by a British military lawyer
suggested that the principle would ban a weapon outright only when that
weapon was "in practice found inevitably to cause injury or suffering
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disproportionate to its military effectiveness."6S Other experts contested the
use of the word "inevitably" and argued that it was sufficient if the weapon
caused such effects in its "normal" use. Article 35 (2) of Additional Protocol I
speaks of weapons "of a nature" to cause unnecessary suffering. It is doubtful
whether the use of this formula offers any greater degree of clarity. In practice,
if it can plausibly be argued that there is a significant range of cases in which a
weapon can be used without causing unnecessary suffering, the weapon itself is
unlikely to be regarded as unlawful under this principle. That conclusion is
confirmed by the paucity of examples of contemporary weapons described in
the literature as contravening the unnecessary suffering principle.69 The result
is that the unnecessary suffering principle has generally been more important in
prohibiting particular uses of weapons (i.e., methods of warfare) than the
weapons themselves.
Secondly, as has been seen, the criteria to be employed on both sides of the
equation in the unnecessary suffering principle are far from clear. Moreover,
even if the criteria themselves were clearer, it is frequently very difficult when a
new weapon is developed for anyone outside the circle of those who have been
responsible for its development to make an informed assessment of the military
advantages which it offers or the medical effects which its use is likely to
produce.
Finally, even when sufficient information about the weapon is available, a
determination of whether or not its use would violate the unnecessary suffering
principle requires a balancing of the likely military advantages and the likely
human suffering which its use in the future will entail, and then a comparison
between that balance and what would result from the use of alternative
weapons. It is scarcely surprising that agreement on the outcome of applying
such a test is seldom achieved.
(b) The Principle of Discrimination. The second general principle prohibits
the use of indiscriminate weapons or-which is more important in
practice-the indiscriminate use of any weapon, irrespective of whether that
weapon is inherently indiscriminate. This principle is, in fact, a compound of
three separate principles. First, it is well established in customary international
law that it is unlawful to direct attacks against the civilian population,
individual civilians or civilian property. Under the principle of distinction, a
belligerent is required to distinguish between the enemy's combatants and
military objectives on the one hand and the civilian population and civilian
property on the other, and direct his attacks only against the former. 7o
Secondly, even if the target of an attack is a legitimate military objective, the
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principle of proportionality provides that it is prohibited to proceed with the
attack if it:
IMlay be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.?l

Finally, if there is a choice of the methods or means of attack, there is a
requirement to take all feasible precautions with a view to avoiding or
minimizing incidental civilian casualties and damageY
These principles go primarily to the question of targeting, a matter which
falls outside the scope of this paper. 73 Nevertheless, they also have an effect
upon the law of weaponry. If a weapon is incapable of being used in a way which
permits discrimination between military targets and civilians or civilian
objects, then it is inherently indiscriminate and these principles render it
unlawful. In practice, very few weapons are so inaccurate that they cannot be
used in a way which complies with the principles set out in the preceding
paragraph, although the VI and V2 missiles used by Germany in the Second
World War probably fell into that category.14 A far more common case of
conduct prohibited by these principles is the indiscriminate use of a weapon
which is capable of being used in a discriminating way. Iraq's use of Scud
missiles during the Gulfhostilities in 1991 is an example.15
These principles are some of the most important cornerstones of the law of
armed conflict. They were so widely disregarded during the Second World War
that it was open to question whether they could still be regarded as part of the
customary law. Since 1945, however, they have been reaffirmed on a number of
occasions, most recently in Additional Protocol I, and were applied by, for
example, the Coalition States in the operations against Iraq in 1991.76 Their
status as part of the contemporary customary law cannot now be doubted.
While difficulties in their application remain, Protocol I has resolved a great
many problems. In particular, it has clarified the principle that attacks must be
directed only against military objectives by offering a workable definition of a
military objective and has made clear that in applying the test of
proportionality, only a "concrete and direct military advantage," rather than a
nebulous concept such as the effect on enemy morale, is to be weighed against
the effect of an attack upon the civilian population.
The principles contain both absolute and relative elements. The principle of
distinction possesses an absolute character-civilians and civilian objects must
never knowingly be made the object of attack and care must be taken to ensure
that any target is, in fact, a legitimate military objective. 77 The principle of
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proportionality, on the other hand, involves a balancing of the military
advantages to be gained from an attack upon a military target against expected
civilian losses and damage. As with the principle of unnecessary suffering, if
those same military advantages can be achieved in different ways, one of which
involves likely civilian casualties whereas the other does not, then the choice of
the first route will entail a violation of the principle. However, the same
qualifications apply here. In determining whether a commander who possesses
a choice of weapons or methods of warfare should select one rather than the
other, the extent to which both are truly available to him (in the light of such
considerations as the likely future calls on precision munitions, the protection
of his own forces and the logistic questions considered in the previous section)
must be examined. The difference is that, although the security of his own
forces remains an important part of this calculation, the need to reduce the risk
to the civilian population means that a commander may be required to accept a
higher degree of risk to his own forces.
Where the proportionality principle differs from the unnecessary suffering
principle is that it is clearly established that it does not stop at the prohibition of
unnecessary collateral injury and damage, but also requires a belligerent to
abstain from an attack altogether, even if that means losing a military
advantage which cannot be obtained by other means, if the military advantage
would not be worth the expected civilian casualties and damage. The principle
of proportionality is thus a more substantial constraint than the unnecessary
suffering principle. Nevertheless, it remains a requirement to balance military
gains against civilian losses; it does not possess an absolute character. In this
respect, the Commentary on Additional Protocol I published by the
International Committee of the Red Cross is misleading when it says that:
The idea has been put fonvard that even if they are very high, civilian losses and
damage may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of great importance.
This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol. ... The Protocol
does not provide any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian
losses and damage. Incidental losses and damage should never be extensive.78

What the principle of proportionality (as stated in both customary law and
the Protocol) prohibits is the causing of excessive civilian losses and damage. By
substituting the word extensive, the Commentary replaces a term which
necessarily implies a balance between two competing considerations with a
term which suggests an absolute ceiling on civilian losses. There is no basis in
the law for such an approach.
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The Gulf conflict of 1990,91 demonstrated that the principles which are
designed to protect the civilian population are workable. That conflict,
however, also highlighted the fact that the proportionality test today requires
consideration of a wider range of issues than in the past. In the Gulf conflict,
Coalition air raids and naval bombardment of military targets appear to have
caused relatively few direct civilian losses, but the damage done to the Iraqi
power generating system and other parts of Iraq's infrastructure did far more
harm to the civilian population. Application of the proportionality test today,
at least at the strategic level, requires that less immediate damage of this kind
must also be taken into account, although the difficulty of doing so is apparent.
The treaty statements of the discrimination principles do not apply to naval
warfare except in so far as it involves the civilian population on land.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are restrictions on targeting in naval warfare. 79
In particular, merchant ships are not automatically to be treated as legitimate
targets unless they engage in certain kinds of behavio'ur. It has therefore been
suggested in a recent study that the principles of distinction and proportionality
are applicable, mutatis mutandis, as part of the customary law of naval warfare,
with consequent implications for the law of weaponry in a naval context.so
(c) The Prohibition of Perfidy. The principle which prohibits the use of
perfidy is well established in both customary international law and Additional
Protocol I. The somewhat mixed objectives which this principle seeks to
achieve have already been discussed in Part III and little more need be said
here. There is probably no weapon which is inherently perfidious,81 and the
principle therefore operates entirely upon the methods of warfare.
The humanitarian rationale of this principle is concisely set out in Article
37(1) of Additional Protocol I as "inviting the confidence of an adversary to
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection
under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to
betray that confidence." The provision then goes on to give the following
examples of perfidy:
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a
surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non' combatant status; and
(d) the feigning of
status by the use of signs, emblems or
uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to
the conflict.
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Article 38 adds a specific prohibition on the improper use of the emblems
(principally the Red Cross and Red Crescent) of the Geneva Conventions and
internationally recognized protective emblems, such as the flag of truce, as well
as any unauthorized use of the United Nations emblem.s2 By contrast, Article
37 (2) provides that:
Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to
mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule
of intemationallaw applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious
because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to
protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of
camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.
As has already been seen, these provisions, which reflect customary
international law, serve a clear humanitarian objective. The prohibition in
Article 39(1) of the use by belligere.nts of the flags, emblems, and uniforms of
neutral States or other States not party to the conflict also serves that
objective, since it also seeks to protect persons and objects which would not be
legitimate targets of attack. That 'is not true, however, of the rule in Article
39(2) which forbids the use of enemy flags and uniforms by a belligerent while
engaging in an attack or in order to shield, favor, protect, or impede military
operations. The objective behind the latter rule is quite different and serves no
obvious humanitarian purpose.S3
Traditionally, the law on ruses in naval warfare has been different. In naval
warfare, the use of enemy flags and signals is entirely legitimate up to the point
at which an attack is commenced.sf There is, therefore, no equivalent of the
rule in Article 39(2) of Additional Protocol I (which is expressly stated not to
apply to naval warfare).B5 The principles in Articles 37 and 38 of the Protocol
are intended to apply to all forms of warfare, but their application to naval
hostilities necessitates some modification to take account of the different
conditions of naval warfare. The San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea states the basic principle of perfidy in the
same terms used in Additional Protocol I, Article 37(1), and adds, as specific
examples of perfidious behavior:
... the launching of an attack while feigning:
(a) exempt, civilian, neutral or protected United Nations status;
(b) surrender or distress by, e.g., sending a distress signal or by the crew
taking to life rafts.86
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This provision was supported by a large group of experts and is in accordance
with the approach taken in the United States Naval Commander's Handbook. 57
It is open to question, however, whether sub,paragraph (a) reflects customary
law, since the practice of disguising warships as merchant vessels and the use of
Q,ships was extensively practised during the Second World War and there is
no clear practice to the contrary since that date.ss
The San Remo Manual also states that:
Ruses of war are permitted. Warships and auxiliary vessels, however, are
prohibited from launching an attack whilst flying a false flag, and at all times from
actively simulating the status of:
(a) hospital ships, small coastal rescue craft or medical transports;

(b) vessels on humanitarian missions;
(c) passenger vessels carrying civilian passengers;
(d) vessels protected by the United Nations flag;
(e) vessels guaranteed safe conduct by prior agreement between the
parties, including cartel vessels;
(f) vessels entitled to be identified by the emblem of the red cross or red
crescent; or
(g) vessels engaged in transporting cultural property under special
protection.89

(d) The Principle of Environmental Protection. A number of specific rules of
the law of armed conflict operate, expressly or impliedly, to protect the
natural environment. Thus, the 1977 Environmental Modification Treaty
addresses the potential problem of a belligerent seeking to use the
environment as a means of warfare in itself by prohibiting the use of
environmental modification techniques which have widespread,
long,lasting, or severe effects upon the environment.9o This treaty, however,
deals with the exceptional case of the deliberate manipulation of the
environment for military purposes, rather than the far more common case of
environmental damage inflicted in the course of ordinary military operations.
To some extent, the prohibition of the wanton destruction of property and
the use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the restrictions on the
use of land mines and incendiary weapons indirectly protect the
environment. T aday, however, it is argued that there is a broader, general
principle of respect for the environment in time of armed conflict.91
For States party to Additional Protocol I, such a principle is to be found in
Article 35(3), which states that:
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It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment.92

This provision was, however, an innovation in 1977 and cannot be regarded as
forming part of customary internationallaw.93
Nevertheless, there are clear indications that a general principle of
environmental respect is emerging and may well already form part of customary
law. Thus, the 1995 edition of the U.S. Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations stipulates that:
It is not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural environment during
an attack upon a legitimate military objective. However, the commander has an
affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the
extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To
that end, and as far as military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare
should be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the
natural environment. Destruction of the natural environment not necessitated
by mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited. Therefore, a
commander should consider the environmental damage which will result from
an attack on a legitimate military objective as one of the factors during target
analysis.94

In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
the International Court ofJustice stated that:
States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing
what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to
assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and
proportionality. 95

The United Nations General Assembly has expressed similar views.96 While
the language may be different in each case, the general sense is substantially the
same.97
(e) Other General Principles. Before leaving the subject of the general
principles, it is necessary to consider whether any other general principle may
have become part of the law of weaponry. There is, of course, the principle that
the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose the methods and means
of warfare is not unlimited. 98 This principle is not, however, a free-standing
norm, since it gives no indication what the limitations upon the right to choose
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might be. It serves only to introduce the limitations, both general and specific,
laid down elsewhere in the law.
A more substantial contender is the Martens Clause, which first appeared in
the Preamble to Hague Convention No. II of 1899. The most recent version of
this clause appears as Article 1 (2) of Additional Protocol I:
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements,
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience.
It has sometimes been argued that the use of a particular weapon or method
of warfare might be unlawful, as a result of the Martens Clause, even though it
was not outlawed by any of the general principles or specific provisions of the
law of weaponry.99 According to this approach, a weapon will be unlawful if its
effects are so contrary to considerations of humanity and the public conscience
that it arouses widespread revulsion. This view is based upon a
misunderstanding of the Martens Clause. There is no doubt that one effect of
the Clause is that the absence of a specific treaty provision does not mean that
a weapon must be lawful; the Clause makes clear that the general principles
embodied in customary law still apply and that the use of a weapon contrary to
those principles will be unlawful. Furthermore, the Martens Clause
undoubtedly states what has frequently been the motivating force behind the
adoption of a specific ban (e.g., those on land mines and laser weapons). There
is no evidence, however, that the use of any weapon has ever been treated by
the international community as unlawful solely on account of the Martens
Clause and the Clause should not be regarded as laying down a separate general
principle for judging the legality of weapons under existing law. loo
Finally, it can reasonably be said that the undoubted duty to respect the
territorial integrity of neutral States implies the existence of a general principle
that the belligerents must abstain from the use of methods and means of
warfare which cause disproportionate damage to the territory of neutral States.
This principle has only very limited significance for the use of weapons other
than nuclear weapons and it is in that context that it will be considered below.

(2) Rules on Specific Weapons. The evolution of the treaty provisions
regulating the use of specific weapons has already been outlined in Part II.
Unlike the general principles of the law of weaponry, these specific provisions
tend to concentrate upon the means used (e.g., exploding bullets ofless than
400 grammes weight, laser weapons, chemical weapons), rather than the
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effects produced (e.g., unnecessary suffering, disproportionate civilian
casualties). They fall into three broad groups:
• Limitations on the use of a particular weapon which fall short of an
outright ban;
• Bans on the use, but not the possession and, perhaps, not the retaliatory
use, of a particular weapon; and
• Bans on both use and possession.
It is not intended in this paper to try to analyze all of the specific weapons
provisions. Instead, three categories of weapons-laser weapons, land mines,
and chemical weapons-which have been the subject of important legal
changes in the 1990s, and which illustrate the three categories set out above,
will be examined.
(a) The Lasers Protocol In October 1995, a Conference was convened
under the provisions of Article 8(3) of the 1981 Weapons Convention to
review the scope and operation of the Convention and its three Protocols. One
of the items on the agenda of the Review Conference was a proposal for the
adoption of a new protocol to the Weapons Convention to ban the use of
weapons (a type of weapon not then in common use but
which it was believed would be widely available before long) on the ground that
such weapons would cause permanent blindness. This issue had been under
consideration by the International Committee of the Red Cross for several
years. 101 It had been argued by some commentators that the use of laser
weapons to blind enemy combatants was already prohibited by the unnecessary
suffering principle. 102 That conclusion was challenged, however, by others who
argued that a blinding weapon could not be regarded as causing unnecessary
suffering when the alternative weapons could cause death.l03 In fact, the
arguments are finely balanced and the unnecessary suffering principle probably
does not outlaw the use of
lasers as such, although it might
prohibit their use in certain circumstances. 104 In view of this difference of
opinion and the uncertainty inherent in the application of the unnecessary
lasers not surprisingly
suffering principle, the opponents of
decided that it was necessary to seek a specific ban.
In this case, the approach of seeking to eliminate an entire category of
weapons was never an option. Lasers are used on the battlefield for a wide range
of undoubtedly legitimate purposes, including target identification and range
finding, which would not normally involve injury to eyesight and which States
were not willing to abandon. In addition, several States distinguished between
the use oflasers against the human eye and their use against equipment optical
systems, where there was a risk of incidental injury to the human eye.
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The new agreement, 105 adopted by the Review Conference as Protocol IV to
the Weapons Convention, reflects these views. Article 1 prohibits the
employment of "laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat
function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to
unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective
eyesight devices." The use oflaser weapons which do not have as one of their
combat functions the causing of permanent blindness to the naked eye is not,
therefore, prohibited and, if blindness is caused as a collateral consequence of
the use of such a weapon, or the use of other laser systems such as range finders,
there will be no violation of the Pro to col. 106 Article 2 of the Protocol, however,
requires the parties to take all feasible precautions, when using laser systems
not prohibited by the Protocol, to avoid causing blindness to the unenhanced
vision of enemy combatants.
The result is a treaty that bans the use of a fairly narrow category of
weapons-laser weapons specifically designed to cause blindness. The use of
other types of laser weapon, even if it results in blindness, remains lawful. At
the time of writing, the Protocol had not yet entered into force. When it does, it
will be binding only upon those States parties to the Weapons Convention
which opt to become bound by Protocol IV.
(b) Land Mines. Unlike laser weapons, land mines have been the subject of a
sustained campaign during the 1990s to achieve a total ban. Whereas the
concern about blinding laser weapons centered on the unnecessary suffering
principle, the move to ban land mines was motivated more by the effects which
their use had been shown to have upon the civilian population, often long after
the conflict. Nevertheless, while the indiscriminate use of land mines was a
violation of the general principle of distinction, they were also capable oflawful
use, against military targets or as a means of denying an adversary access to an
area ofland.
Protocol II to the Weapons Convention already contained limitations on
the use ofland mines and booby,traps.l07 So far as mines lO8 were concerned, the
original Protocol II limited their use in the following ways:
• By prohibiting their use against civilians and their indiscriminate use
(Article 3), although this added nothing to the general principles on targeting;
• By imposing a more specific restriction on the use of mines in centers of
civilian population where combat was not actually taking place (Article 4);
• By prohibiting the use of remotely delivered mines unless they are used
within an area which is itself a military objective and either their location is
accurately recorded or they are fitted with a self,neutralizing mechanism which
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will render the mine harmless or destroy it when it no longer serves the military
purpose for which it was laid (Article 5); and
• By requiring the recording and publication of the location of minefields
and co,operation in their removal after a conflict (Articles 7 and 9).
The provisions of the Protocol are very limited. Only Article 5 imposed a
substantial limitation and this is "clumsily worded."lo9 Not surprisingly, these
provisions were widely regarded as insufficient in view of the devastating effects
of land mines--often continuing for many years after the end of active
hostilitiesYo A number of States therefore pressed for a complete ban onland
mines, while others urged the Review Conference to tighten the restrictions in
Protocol II.
The first result was the adoption in 1996 of an amended Protocol II111 which
goes some way towards tightening the restrictions on the use ofland mines and
increasing the protection of the civilian population. The most important
changes introduced by the amendments;are as follows:
• A ban on the use of various devices which make mine clearance more
dangerous (Article 3 (5) and (6));
• A ban on the use of anti,personnel mines which are not detectable, as
specified in the technical annex to the Protocol (Article 4);
• Restrictions on the use of mines which do not meet the requirements in
the technical annex (Article 5). The technical annex requires that mines
produced after 1 January 1997 must meet certain requirements regarding
detection and self,neutralization and their location must be carefully recorded;
• Stricter constraints on the use of remotely delivered mines (Article 6);
• Stricter rules for the protection of peacekeepers and others not directly
involved in the conflict (Article 12) and for the protection of civilians (Article
3(8) to (11));
• A more extensive obligation regarding mine clearance after the conflict
(Articles 10 and 11); and
• A prohibition on the transfer of mines which do not meet the
requirements of the Protocol and limitations on the transfer of mines which do
meet those requirements (Article 8).
The amended Protocol II is thus considerably more stringent than the original
Protocol. Whether it will succeed in significantly reducing the threat posed to
civilians by mines is another matter. One of the biggest threats to civilians is the
large numbers of old mines, readily available and cheap, which do not meet the
requirements of the amended Protocol and which are likely to be used by
untrained personnel. This risk is particularly acute in civil wars; indeed, it is in
the civil wars in Angola and Cambodia that some of the worst casualties from
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land mines have been sustained. It is therefore an important development that
the amended Protocol is expressly applied to internal armed conflicts within
the meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, where it applies
both to the government and rebel parties.ll2 Since the other Protocols to the
Weapons Convention contain no provision on the scope of their application,
they apply only in the circumstances specified in Article 1 of the Weapons
Convention itself, namely international armed conflicts, including wars of
"national liberation" as defined in Article 1 (4) of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. It has, however, been suggested, notwithstanding the
absence of any express provision regarding internal conflicts in the new Protocol
W, that Protocol was also intended to apply to internal armed conflicts,1l3
although no trace of such an understanding is to be found in its text.
The amended Protocol II did not go far enough for a large body of States.
They aimed instead at a complete ban on the use and transfer of land mines
and, to that end, adopted a separate treaty in 1997. The United Nations
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti,Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, as its name
suggests, is a complete ban on the use of anti,personnelland mines. l14 The
Convention, the Preamble of which echoes the language of the Martens Clause
and refers specifically to both the unnecessary suffering principle and the
principle of distinction, goes beyond a ban on the use of anti,personnel mines
"in all circumstances" and bans their production, stockpiling, and possession,
as well as the transfer of such mines to others. The definition of an
anti,personnel mine, however, excludes mines "designed to be detonated by
the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person," even if
equipped with anti,handling devices.115 The Convention requires that all
parties take steps, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to ensure
implementation of its provisions.u 6 While the conclusion of this Convention
was a triumph for the opponents ofland mines, its effectiveness is likely to be
limited as a number of major military powers have declined to participate.
Once the 1997 Convention and the amended Protocol II enter into force,
there will be a complex network of obligations regarding land mines:
• States party to the 1997 Convention will be obliged not to employ
anti,personnelland mines in any circumstances, even in hostilities with States
not party to the Convention;
• States party to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention which elect
to become party to the amended Protocol II will be bound by that Protocol in
their relations with other States party to the 1980 Convention which have
accepted that Protocol;
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• States party to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention which elect
not to become party to the amended Protocol II will remain bound by the
original Protocol II in their relations with other parties which have made the
same choice; and
• States not party to the 1980 Convention or which have not accepted
either version of Protocol II will remain subject in dieir use ofland mines only
to the customary law general principles on unnecessary suffering and
distinction and other States will be subject to the same regime in their relations
with such States (unless, of course, they are parties to the 1997 Convention).
As students of the law will doubtless testify, multiplicity of law making bodies
has its price.
(c) Chemical Weapons. By far the most important development in the law of
weaponry during the last decade of the twentieth century has been the adoption
in 1993 of a new Chemical Weapons Convention.ll7 The use of chemical
weapons in warfare had already been prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 118
That prohibition, however, was incomplete in a number of respects. In
particular, so many States had entered reservations to the 1925 Protocol, to the
effect that they retained the right to use chemical weapons if those weapons were
first used against themselves or their allies, that the Protocol was, in reality, only
a ban on the first use of such weaponsY9 The use of chemical weapons by Iraq,
first against Iranian armed forces and later against parts of Iraq's own civilian
population, during the Iran,Iraq war,120 and the threats by Iraq to use chemical
weapons during the Kuwait conflict,121 highlighted the weakness of the existing
legal regime. The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons was reaffirmed by a
declaration adopted by 149 States at the Paris Conference in January 1989.
Subsequent negotiations led to the adoption of the new convention in 1993. The
Convention entered into force in April 1997 .
The 1993 Convention establishes a legal regime far more extensive than
that contained in the 1925 Protocol and customary international law. While
space does not permit a detailed analysis of the provisions of the 1993
Convention here, 122 three points call for comment. First, the scope of the 1993
Convention is broader than that of the 1925 Protocol. The range of weapons
covered by the 1925 Protocol had long been the subject of debate, with the
United States, and latterly the United Kingdom, arguing that non,lethal riot
control agents lay outside the scope of the Protocol,l23 an interpretation
contested by many other States. The new Convention expressly prohibits the
use of riot control agents "as a method of warfare.,,124 While this prohibition
still leaves some room for debate about whether a particular use of riot control
agents (for example, to suppress a riot at a prisoner of war camp or to deal with
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demonstrators in occupied territory) constitutes their use "as a method of
warfare," it clearly outlaws the use of riot control agents against enemy forces in
combat or in bombardment of enemy targets. In addition, the obligation placed
upon States parties by Article I, paragraph 1, never to use chemical weapons
"under any circumstances" applies to
armed conflicts, as
well as to conflicts between States. l25 While it had been argued by some States
and commentators that the prohibition in the 1925 Protocol was also
conflicts, 126 the matter was not free from doubt
applicable to
and the greater clarity of the new Convention is thus most welcome.
Secondly, the 1993 Convention prohibits all use of chemical weapons in
warfare, not just their first use. The obligation never to use chemical weapons
in any circumstances, contained in Article I, was intended to exclude the
operation of the doctrine of belligerent reprisals as a justification for employing
chemical weapons. In addition, Article XXII provides that the Convention is
not subject to reservations, so that there is no scope for States to become
parties subject to the kind of reservations which many entered on becoming
parties to the 1925 Protocol. That does not mean that a State which was the
victim of a chemical attack in violation of the Convention may not retaliate.
The Convention prohibits retaliation in kind, in the form of a chemical
but it does not affect the right of States to retaliate by other
means. In this context, a particularly important question is whether a State
could lawfully resort to the use of a nuclear weapon in response to a chemical
attack. This possibility was considered at some length by Judge Schwebel in his
dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, where he discussed the threat
of nuclear retaliation allegedly made by the United States to dissuade Iraq from
resorting to chemical weapons during the Kuwait conflict. 127 In the writer's
view, the Court's advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case leaves open the
question whether such a reprisal would be lawfuL
Finally, the 1993 Convention goes far beyond a prohibition on the use of
chemical weapons and outlaws their manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling, and
transfer.128 It also requires States to destroy their existing stocks. 129 The
Convention creates a complex regime of inspection and verification, which
goes beyond that envisaged by the Land Mines Convention, the object of
which is to guarantee that chemical weapons are completely eliminated. This
ambitious project takes the Convention out of the scope of the law of armed
conflict and into the realm of arms controL It remains to be seen whether some
of the doubts expressed about the effectiveness of this regime can be overcome
and the goal of the Convention attained.

212

Christopher Greenwood
(3) Nuclear Weapons. 130 Nuclear weapons merit separate consideration, both
because of their inherent importance and because of the intensity of the debate
about whether their use could ever be compatible with the law of weaponry.
Those who argue that it could not have tended to base their case on one or
more of three propositions.
• That there exists in international law a specific prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons. Since there is evidently no treaty of general application
containing such a prohibition, this argument is based upon a series of
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly over the years; 131
• That one of the other specific prohibitions applies directly, or by analogy,
to nuclear weapons. The prohibitions on which reliance is usually placed being
those on chemical weapons and poisoned weapons; and
• That any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably violate one or more of
the general principles of the law of weaponry.
These arguments have been fully canvassed both in the literature 132 and in the
submissions of certain States to the International Court of Justice in the
proceedings on the request for an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat

or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 133

Those who take a contrary view do not, for the most part, deny that the law
of weaponry is applicable to nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is striking that none of
the
which made submissions to the Internatiol'lal Court
of Justice took such a position.13 4 The only respect in which the law of
weaponry does not apply to nuclear weapons is that the innovative provisions
introduced by Additional Protocol I were adopted on the understanding that
they would not apply to the use of nuclear weapons. 13S They maintain,
however, that there is no specific prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in
international law, that the prohibitions on chemical weapons and poison do
not extend to nuclear weapons, and that it is possible to envisage
circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used without violating the
general principles.
In some respects, the Court's Advisory Opinion has clarified the issues in
this debate. 136 The Court found (by eleven votes to three) that there was no
specific prohibition of nuclear weapons, the majority taking the view that the
General Assembly resolutions were insufficient to create a rule of customary
international law in view of the strong opposition and contrary practice of a
significant number of States.137 The Court also rejected the argument that
nuclear weapons were covered by the prohibitions on chemical weapons or
poisoned weapons. The Court found that the various treaties on chemical and
biological weapons had "each been adopted in its own context and for its own
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reasons" and concluded that the prohibition of other weapons of mass
destruction did not imply the prohibition of nuclear weapons, while the ban on
poisoned weapons had never been understood by States to apply to nuclear
weapons. us
Given the Court's conclusions on these points (which, it is submitted, are
manifestly correct), the Court necessarily concentrated on the application to
nuclear weapons of the general principles. The Court referred, in particular, to
the prohibition of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, the
prohibition of attacks upon civilians and of the use of indiscriminate methods
and means of warfare, and the principle protecting neutral States from
incursions onto their territory. Although the Court noted that the use of
nuclear weapons was "scarcely reconcilable" with respect for these principles, it
concluded that it did not have:
[S]ufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of
law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstancep9

This passage suggests that the Court should therefore have concluded that the
use of nuclear weapons was not unlawful in all circumstances. In fact, however,
it adopted, by seven votes to seven on the casting vote of the President, the
following conclusion:
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of
fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake. l40

The Opinion is not easy to follow at this point. In the absence of a specific
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the only basis upon which the Court
could have concluded, consistently with its own earlier reasoning, that such
use was illegal in all circumstances would have been by analyzing the
circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used and then applying the
principles of humanitarian law which were relevant. At the heart of any such
analysis would have been three questions.
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• Would the use of a nuclear weapon in the particular circumstances inflict

unnecessary suffering upon combatants?
• Would the use of a nuclear weapon in the particular circumstances be
directed against civilians or indiscriminate, or, even if directed against a
military target, be likely to cause disproportionate civilian casualties ?
• Would the use of a nuclear weapon in the particular circumstances be
likely to cause disproportionate harmful effects to a neutral State?
To answer those questions would have required both a factual appreciation of
the capabilities of the weapon being used and the circumstances of its use and a
value judgement about whether the adverse consequences of that use were
"unnecessary" or "disproportionate" when balanced against the military goals
which the State using the nuclear weapon was seeking to achieve.
The Court did not, however, attempt that task but merely enumerated the
relevant principles, with little discussion, before reaching the conclusions
quoted above.141 It is not clear, therefore, how it arrived at its conclusion that
the use of nuclear weapons would "generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict," nor, indeed, what it meant by
the term "generally" in this context. It is clear, both from the voting on
paragraph 2E of the dispositif and from some of the separate and dissenting
opinions, that there was a considerable divergence of views within the Court.
Nevertheless, if one looks at the Opinion as a whole, the only interpretation
of the first part of paragraph 2E which can be reconciled with the reasoning of
the Court is that, even without the qualification in the second part of the
paragraph, the Court was not saying that the use of nuclear weapons would be
contrary to the law of armed conflict in all cases. It could only have reached
such a conclusion if it had found that there were no circumstances in which
nuclear weapons could be used without causing unnecessary suffering, striking
civilians and military targets indiscriminately (or with excessive civilian
casualties), or causing disproportionate damage to neutral States. The Court
did not make such an analysis, and the reasoning gives no hint that it reached
such a conclusion. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could have done so. In
considering the application of principles of such generality to the use of
weapons in an indefinite variety of circumstances, the Court could not have
determined that as a matter oflaw a nuclear weapon could not be used without
violating one or more of those principles,142 even if some of its members
suspected as a matter of fact that that was so.
This reading of the Opinion is reinforced by the fact that there is only one
other basis upon which the second part of paragraph 2E of the dispositif could
make sense. That is that, although the use of nuclear weapons would always be
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contrary to the law of armed conflict, the Court was not prepared to exclude
the possibility that there might be circumstances in which the right of a State to
self,defense could override the prohibition imposed by the law of armed
conflict. Although that interpretation has received a measure of support,143 it
flies in the face of the long established principle that the law of armed conflict
applies equally to both sides in a conflict. To hold that the party exercising the
right of self,defense can depart from fundamental principles of the law of armed
conflict would drive a coach and horses through that principle. 144
The Court's Opinion has attracted an enormous amount of interest among
academic commentators. It is a mark of the ambiguity of the Opinion in general
and of paragraph 2E in particular, that some commentators have seen it as
largely vindicating the position of the nuclear,weapons States, while others
have claimed it as a victory for the anti, nuclear lobby.145 The present writer
finds the analysis of the first group the more persuasive.

V. The Applicability to Weaponry of Other Rules of International Law
It is tempting to take the view that once States resort to the use of force, the
law of armed conflict, as lex specialis, takes over from all other parts of
international law. On this view, the use of methods and means of warfare is
governed exclusively by the law of weaponry. In practice, however, that law
does not operate in isolation and the rest of international law cannot be
disregarded in determining whether the use of a particular weapon is lawful.
Three other areas of international law, all of which were considered by the
International Court ofJustice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, are potentially relevant.
First, it has sometimes been suggested that the use of particular weapons,
especially nuclear weapons, would violate the right to life under human rights
treaties. 146 The United Nations Human Rights Committee, for example, has
commented that "the designing, testing,- manufacture, possession and
deployment of nuclear weapons are amongst the greatest threats to the right
to life which confront mankind today.,,147 However, warfare invariably
involves the taking of life and it is clear that the human rights treaties were
not intended to outlaw all military action even in self,defense. By prohibiting
the arbitrary taking of life, Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the comparable provisions in other human
rights treaties, imply that not all taking of life is prohibited. The travau.x
preparatoires of Article 6 make clear that, in the context of warfare, the term
"arbitrary" was intended to mean the taking of life in circumstances which
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were contrary to the law of armed conflict, and killing in the course of a "lawful
act of war" was expressly given as an example of a taking of life that would not
be arbitrary.148
This was the view taken by the International Court ofJustice in the Nuclear
Weapons case. The Court accepted that the protection of the International
Covenant (and, by implication, other human rights treaties) did not cease in
time of armed conflict but held that:
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed
conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant,
can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.149

This conclusion, though no doubt unwelcome to some human rights
lawyers, is plainly correct in view both of State practice and the travaux
preparatoires of the Covenant. Nevertheless, the Court's acceptance that
human rights treaties continue to apply in time of war (except insofar as
derogation is expressly permitted) may be of considerable importance in other
cases. Although the right to life may add nothing to international
humanitarian law at the substantive level, human rights treaties contain
unique mechanisms for enforcement which may be of great assistance to
individuals seeking to rely upon the right to life in order to show that there has
been a violation of the law of armed conflict. ISO
Secondly, it has been suggested, again primarily in relation to nuclear
weapons, that international environmental law is applicable to the use of
weapons. 1S1 In the Nuclear Weapons case, the Court stated that "the issue is not
whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are
not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations
stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint
during military conflict."lS2 It rejected the argument that the use of nuclear
weapons was prohibited as such by the general environmental treaties or by
customary environmentallaw. 1s3 It would have been extraordinary for the
Court to have concluded that nuclear weapon States, which had so carefully
ensured that treaties on weaponry and the law of armed conflict did not outlaw
the use of nuclear weapons, had relinquished any possibility of their use by
becoming parties to more general environmental agreements. Nevertheless,
the Court indicated that the international law on the environment does not
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altogether cease to apply once an armed conflict breaks out, and it seems that it
found the origins of what it identified as a customary law duty of regard for the
environment in times of war154 as much in the general law on the environment
as in the specific provisions of the law of armed conflict.
Finally, the Nuclear Weapons case confirms that:
A threat or use offorce by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful. 155

This proposition was not contested by any of the States which submitted
arguments to the Court.
The Court held that the right of self,defense under Article 51 of the Charter
was subject to the limitations of proportionality and necessity which it had
earlier held, in the Nicaragua case,156 were part of the right of self-defense at
customary international law .157 It also concluded that, although neither Article
2(4) nor Article 51 refers to specific weapons, the need to ensure that a use of
force in self,defense was proportionate had implications for the degree of force
and, consequently, for the weaponry which a State might lawfully use. The
proportionality requirement of self,defense thus had an effect upon the legality
of the way in which a State conducted hostilities. In determining whether the
use of a particular weapon in a given case was lawful, it was therefore necessary
to look at both international humanitarian law and the requirements of the
right of self,defense.
The Court's opinion on this point is of considerable importance. The logic
of the Charter and customary law provisions on self,defense means that the
modemjus ad bellum cannot be regarded as literally a "law on going to war,"
the importance of which fades into the background once the fighting has
started and the jus in bello comes into operation. ISS The jus ad bellum imposes
an additional level of constraint upon a State's conduct of hostilities,
affecting, for example, its choice of weapons and targets and the area of
conflict. The Court did not, however, accept, as some commentators had
argued, that the use of nuclear weapons could never be a proportionate
measure of self-defense. 159 In reaching this conclusion, it appears to have
accepted that proportionality has to be assessed, as Judge Higgins put it, by
considering "what is proportionate to repelling the attack" and not treated as
"a requirement of symmetry between the mode of the initial attack and the
mode of response."160
It is evident, therefore, that the legality of the methods and means of warfare
can no longer be considered by reference to the law of weaponry alone.
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Especially when one considers the more destructive weapons, the law of the
United Nations Charter will be a significant factor to be borne in mind. Human
rights law and international environmental law may also have some
importance, although their application is likely to have only a small impact on
the substantive law applicable to the use of particular weapons.
VI. The Future of the Law of Weaponry
This stocktaking of the law of weaponry at the end of the twentieth century
shows that this part of the law of armed conflict, while not one of the most
effective, cannot be disregarded as an anachronism. The adoption of new
treaties on weapons of real military significance, such as chemical weapons and
land mines, demonstrates that it is possible to develop legal regimes which, if
they are made to function properly, can have a significant impact in protecting
the values of humanitarian law. Similarly, the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons, whatever its shortcomings, shows that the general principles of the
law are capable of developing in such a way that they can be applied to new
types of
How then is the law likely to evolve as we enter the new
millennium?
The outline of two developments is already visible. First, the trend of
extending the law of weaponry from international'armed conflicts to conflicts
within States is likely to prove irreversible. Application to such conflicts has
already been the subject of express provision in the two latest agreements on
land mines and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, the logic of
the position taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in the Took case and the general trend towards the development of
the law of internal conflicts means that most, if not all, of the law of weaponry is
likely to become applicable in internal conflicts in time. There is every reason
why this should be so. While arguments against extending parts of the law of
international armed conflicts, such as those which create the special status of
prisoners of war, to internal hostilities have some force, there is no compelling
argument for accepting that a government may use weapons against its own
citizens which it is forbidden to use against an international adversary, even in
an extreme case of national self,defense.
Secondly, it seems probable that the concept of penal sanctions for those
who violate the law of weaponry will become far more important in the future.
The Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1997 Land Mines Convention
both make express provision for the enactment of criminal sanctions. 161
Certain violations of the principle of distinction are included in the grave
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breaches regime by Additional Protocol I, Article 85. Moreover, any serious
violation of the laws of war is already a war crime and this would include a
serious violation of one of the weaponry treaties or a general principle such as
that prohibiting unnecessary suffering. However, the existence of the two ad
hoc criminal tribunals and the development of their jurisprudence, together
with the likelihood of a future permanent international criminal court with an
extensive war crimes jurisdiction, means that these sanctions are likely to be far
more significant in the future. How far this is a desirable development is
another matter. While the present writer strongly supports the principle of
effective criminal sanctions for violations of the law of armed conflict, it has
been seen that the general principles of the law of weaponry-and, indeed,
some of the specific provisions-are far from clear or easy to apply. It would be
quite wrong to hold individual servicemen, especially low down the chain of
command, criminally responsible for the good faith use of weapons with which
their government has provided them. Moreover, the preparatory talks on the
international criminal court have shown a disturbing tendency to try to use the
negotiation of the Court's statute as a way of revising the substantive law on
weaponry, thus risking upsetting the work of more specialized conferences.
It is less easy to speculate as to what weapons might be made the subject of
new agreements for the prohibition or limitation of their use. Incendiary
weapons, fuel,air explosives, and napalm have all attracted considerable
opprobrium over the last part of the twentieth century and are likely to face
further calls for their limitation or outright prohibition. The precedent of the
campaign against land mines, which attracted far greater publicity than do
most developments in the law of armed conflict, suggests that future calls for
changes in the law of weaponry may come as much from NGOs and public
opinion as from governments. Such a change is both desirable and in keeping
with the spirit of the Martens Clause. It carries the danger, however, that some
of these calls will be unrealistic both in failing to recognize that States must be
able to defend themselves and in the expectations which they create about
what can be achieved.
One of the most important issues is likely to be the future of nuclear
weapons. The inconclusive Opinion of the International Court of Justice
included a unanimous finding that:
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in aU its aspects under strict and
effective international controI.162
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Although this paragraph adds little of substance to the
Treaty, it has already led to calls for fresh negotiations on nuclear
disarmament. In this writer's view, attempts to achieve a ban on the use of
nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future and would
probably prove
in that they will block progress in other
areas (as happened with attempts to reform the law of armed conflict in the
1950's). As far as the possession of nuclear weapons is concerned, a ban is likely
to prove possible only if all the
States (declared and
undeclared) support it, and such a result could not be achieved without
simultaneous progress on a range of related security issues.
One of the most important developments may well prove to be the
application to new types of weaponry of the existing general principles. The
AdvisOry Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case has demonstrated that these
principles are capable of being applied to weapons of a kind which was beyond
contemplation when those principles were first developed. The flexibility of
the general principles thus makes them of broader application than the specific
provisions which are all too easily overtaken by new technology. If the speed of
change in military technology continues into the next century (as seems almost
inevitable),163 that capacity to adapt is going to be ever more important.
Take one example. Suppose that it became possible for a State to cause
havoc to an enemy through the application of electronic measures or the
selective planting of computer viruses which brought to a standstill whole
computer systems and the infrastructure which depended upon them. Such a
method of warfare would appear to be wholly outside the scope of the existing
law. Yet that is not really so. The application of those measures, though not
necessarily an "attack" within the meaning of Additional Protocol I because no
violence need be involved,164 is still likely to affect the civilian population and
possibly to cause great damage and even loss of life amongst that population.
As such, it should be subject to the same principles of distinction and
proportionality considered above.
The application of the general principles of such forms of warfare would,
however, require a measure of refinement of those principles. The place in the
concept of proportionality which should be given to indirect, less immediate
harm to the civilian population would have to be resolved. Similarly, if the
principle of distinction is to be applied to existing, let alone new, weapons of
naval warfare, a clearer assessment needs to be made of exactly what
constitutes a legitimate target in naval hostilities. Both the military and
humanitarian aspects of the unnecessary suffering principle need to be clarified
if that principle is to have a significant impact in the assessment of new
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methods and means of warfare. The duty which States have to scrutinize
developments in weaponry and to assess whether any new weapons or methods
of warfare comply with the law165 means that the resolution of such questions is
a matter of considerable importance.
In this writer's opinion, it is both more probable and more desirable that the
law will develop in this evolutionary way than by any radical change. With the
law of weaponry, as with most of the law of armed conflict, the most important
humanitarian gain would come not from the adoption of new law but the
effective implementation of the law that we have. That should be the priority
for the next century.
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